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A B S T R A C T   
Policy discourses are important platforms for political actors to express their preferences on certain issues and are 
usually linked to a specific policy subsystem. From a research perspective, they have the potential to indicate 
ideological coalitions, policy change and learning. Using discourse network analysis, we identify core policy 
actors, issues, and coalitions in Switzerland’s climate policy discourse and investigate how they have evolved 
over the past 15 years. In line with the policy process literature, we expected to see more stability than change in 
the discourse linked to the mature climate policy subsystem. However, our results have shown that policy dis-
courses are more volatile than policy subsystems, and that national and international policy developments are 
able to trigger change, particularly in terms of the configuration of actor coalitions and the issues discussed.   
Introduction 
The international community will soon celebrate the 30th anniver-
sary of the Rio Conference, at which the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was presented and opened for 
signatures. Since 1992, many international summits and Conferences of 
the Parties (COPs) have taken place while, at the same time, countries 
have developed their own climate policies and programmes. Switzerland 
is no exception: The Swiss government began developing climate change 
mitigation measures immediately after the Rio Conference, and finally, 
in the year 2000, the Swiss CO2 Act was introduced. To this day, this act 
constitutes Switzerland’s key policy programme for fighting climate 
change. However, despite its effective implementation, the country is 
still struggling to reach current international standards like the Paris 
Agreement. Nevertheless, international summits, at least in some cases, 
can act as important triggers to raise public awareness and impact the 
salience of the climate issue at a national scale. Although it is not a 
sufficient condition for policy change, greater public attention to a topic 
pressures policymaker to at least take some form of action. In this re-
gard, a lively policy discourse can be an important spark for policy 
change (see Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
Policy discourse is interesting and relevant for several reasons. First, 
it is the “location” where different public and private actors express their 
support for or rejection of a certain policy issue and/or offer a solution to 
a specific problem (Leifeld, 2016). Second, the discourse offers an initial 
indication of how policies could look once they are introduced. A 
discourse is not only about policy issues; it also provides us with infor-
mation about issue salience, major political and ideological conflict 
lines, dominant key players, among other things. Some policy issues will 
end up in legal texts or regulations, which in turn will become the public 
solution to the climate change dilemma. Lastly, over the years, this re-
sults in the development of a policy discourse that matures over time, 
reflecting stability and change in a complex multi-level context between 
international and domestic policymaking. 
In this context, we ask: How has the Swiss policy discourse around 
climate change mitigation developed over the last two decades? Who 
and what were the key actors, issues and coalitions involved? 
To answer these questions, we combine an in-depth analysis of the 
policy discourse for three selected periods with conceptual argumenta-
tion that has been developed in policy process theories. More concretely, 
we investigate stasis and change in the policy discourse, as constituted 
by actors, issues, and coalitions, after the climate change conferences in 
Bali (November 2007 to December 2008), Copenhagen (November 2009 
to December 2010), and Marrakech (November 2016 to December 
2017). 
Discourse network analysis (DNA) is a well-developed and widely 
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applied method of data collection and analysis (Leifeld, 2018, 2016). In 
the first step, researchers systematically code text material (e.g., media 
articles, consultation statements) and identify policy actors and their 
support for or rejection of a specific policy issue. In the second step, the 
actors and issues are linked and presented in a network. Public policy 
researchers frequently apply this tool to identify key policy issues and 
key actors (e.g., Brandenberger et al., 2020; Černý and Ocelík, 2020; 
Kukkonen et al., 2020), to measure and explain the polarisation of the 
discourse (e.g., Abzianidze, 2020; Fisher et al., 2012; Leifeld, 2013), or 
to identify discourse coalitions (e.g., Ghinoi and Steiner, 2020; Kukko-
nen et al., 2018). While DNA researchers often study one period at a time 
(for an exception, see Hilton et al., 2020), the method is well suited to 
comparing several periods as well. Thus, we will be contributing to this 
literature with a dynamic approach that allows us to learn about change 
and stasis in a policy discourse and to link moments of change to in-
ternational and/or national events. While we are aware that it is difficult 
to disentangle the impact of different, almost simultaneous events on 
politics and policy outcomes, the DNA approach helps us to understand 
more precisely which policy actors (co-)support or (co-)reject which 
policy issues about climate policy and how they change (or do not 
change) over time. 
Our results show that a majority of actors and issues change in the 
media discourse over time. However, at the same time, we also see that 
this change is less pronounced among the key actors, as well as in terms 
of the most salient issues in the discourse. Specifically, we find that is-
sues change in line with the political agenda and that the media has a 
tendency to discuss new policy instruments or targets (in contrast to old 
or existing ones). Furthermore, we show that important international 
events can have the momentum to bring more substantive change to a 
national policy discourse, even in the context of a mature policy 
subsystem. 
Political discourse and policy issues 
Issue attention is a central concept in policymaking (Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1991; Howlett, 1997). Public policies are only formulated if 
an issue generates enough attention to be put on the political agenda 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). One platform or arena where policy 
issues are expressed are policy discourses, and an argumentative turn in 
the public policy literature can be observed towards the increasing 
investigation of the nexus between discourses and policies (Fischer and 
Forester, 1993). A policy discourse is therefore defined as a verbal 
interaction between actors about a certain policy and/or policy issues 
(Leifeld, 2016). The support for or rejection of a certain policy issue in 
policy processes shapes decisions starting at the agenda-setting stage 
(Béland, 2010). In this way, a discourse develops, changes and matures. 
Over the years, policy discourse therefore takes different shapes in that 
diverse actors become involved and new issues and ideas are expressed 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Holt and Barkemeyer, 2012). We are 
interested here in the maturation of policy discourse, and in factors that 
might affect the policy discourse over time. The literature on policy 
processes is very rich when it comes to the investigation of stasis and 
change (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). We deduce our key expectations from this liter-
ature on policy processes and will see if they also hold true in policy 
discourses that are investigated over time. 
Policy discourses are often studied in relation to policy subsystems 
(Leifeld, 2013; Shanahan et al., 2011; Ylä-Anttila et al., 2018). The 
defining characteristics of policy subsystems include the geographic 
scope, the topical area, and the policy actors involved (Jenkins-Smith 
et al., 2018). Policy subsystems emerge because formulating and 
implementing public policies and achieving any desirable outcome re-
quires both specialisations among policy actors and the dedication of 
governmental resources through a wide variety of institutional struc-
tures, such as those that could be found in various administrative ar-
rangements (see Jenkins-Smith et al., 2018). When a new policy 
discourse emerges, this often comes close to what is referred to as a 
“nascent policy subsystem” (Stritch, 2015), in which actors do not yet 
have clear and well-formed policy preferences. In such a situation, the 
actors rely either on experiences from other policy fields or on the rec-
ommendations of peers or experts (see Ingold et al., 2017). Alterna-
tively, some researchers argue that a new policy is either absorbed by an 
existing subsystem (and policy issues and related conflict lines are 
reproduced in the discourse), or that a proper discourse and subsystem 
are built (Beverwijk et al., 2008). In both cases, a subsystem becomes 
“mature”. Theoretical expectations and empirical analysis highlight that 
actors within a subsystem, as well as the conflict and coalition structures 
therein, largely remain the same (Pierce et al., 2017; Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
Thus, theory suggests that change, in particular in a mature policy 
subsystem, is usually of minor magnitude and occurs iteratively in 
recurring medium- to short-term cycles of policymaking and issue 
attention (Meijerink, 2005). 
Early elite studies have already come to the conclusion that policy-
making is in the hands of a few actors (Dahl, 1961). Using and 
combining different approaches to identify key players demonstrates 
that the same set of actors is heavily and repeatedly involved in poli-
cymaking (Tait et al., 1978). This has also been confirmed by a very 
recent study of policy networks and the most central actors therein 
(Ingold et al., 2021). Similar conclusions can be found in the literature 
related to issues: In his seminal work, Downs (1972) describes 
issue-attention cycles as a process in which an issue passes through five 
stages from problem perception to media attention and public interest 
all the way to its eventual decline. The same logic is followed by the 
policy cycle (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995; Lasswell, 1956), where a 
problem is perceived and put on the agenda and, if successful, a policy is 
formulated, implemented, evaluated, and sometimes terminated. Policy 
terminations are rare, however; more frequently, reformulations or re-
visions of a policy transcend the policy cycle, once again leading to a 
repetition of policy issues in a policy subsystem. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) assumes that actors and 
issues are resistant to change (Fischer, 2015; Nohrstedt, 2008; Sabatier 
and Smith-Jenkins, 1999), and that actors who support similar policy 
issues (referred to as core beliefs and secondary aspects) tend to organise 
in so-called advocacy coalitions and jointly coordinate their actions to 
influence policies. These advocacy coalitions are similarly resistant to 
change as their members (actors) and beliefs (issues) remain stable 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Research investigating coalitions 
over time has come to the conclusion that coalition structures are 
reproduced over time within a policy subsystem even after shocks or 
other events that draw focus to certain issues (Fischer, 2015; Meijerink, 
2005; Nohrstedt, 2008). Furthermore, discourse network analysis has 
convincingly linked advocacy to discourse coalitions (Leifeld, 2013; 
Schaub and Metz, 2020). 
On the basis of this connection between the literature on policy 
processes and the literature on policy discourses, we have formulated 
the following expectations1 for a policy discourse that has matured over 
time: 
Expectation 1: Over time, the majority of policy actors involved in 
the discourse will stay the same. 
Expectation 2: Over time, the majority of policy issues in the 
1 We use the term “expectation” (in contrast to the more common term hy-
potheses), since we are not investigating the relationship between two vari-
ables. Rather we expect the policy discourse in a mature policy subsystem to 
behave in a certain, theoretically predicted way. In a next step, one could then 
test specific hypotheses that explain why actors, preferences, and coalitions stay 
the same, over time in a mature subsystem. 
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discourse will stay the same. 
Expectation 3: Over time, the actor coalitions involved in the 
discourse will largely2 stay the same. 
Case, data, and methods 
In this section, we introduce our case, justify the selected periods we 
use for our analysis, and present our methods of data gathering and 
analysis. 
Switzerland’s climate policy in an international context 
Switzerland is a small country that is only responsible for less than 
1% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Nevertheless, it tends to 
act as a forerunner and role model in the global climate regime. For 
example, it was among the first to introduce a domestic GHG emissions 
reduction target and a carbon tax, and pushed early for industrialised 
countries to support and finance climate adaptation in developing 
countries. The country’s strong stake in climate protection measures is 
partly due to its Alpine geography, which makes it more vulnerable to 
the effects of climate change, as well as its awareness of its dependency 
on other countries to take action to fight climate change. Domestically, 
climate policy has a long tradition. In fact, the first ideas to implement a 
carbon tax were introduced in the 1970s when the two oil crises raised 
awareness of the need to reduce the dependency on imported fossil fuels. 
This awareness was further increased by the adoption of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. 
As a result, Switzerland introduced a national programme to increase 
energy efficiency in the early 1990s with the goal of stabilising fossil fuel 
consumption and therefore CO2 emissions by 2000 (1990 baseline). 
Despite this promising beginning, the history of Swiss climate policy has 
turned out to be a difficult one, driven by a persistent conflict between 
two opposing advocacy coalitions (e.g., Ingold, 2011; Ingold and 
Fischer, 2014; Kammerer et al., 2020) – the pro-economy coalitions 
(actors from the economy, energy, and transport sectors, as well as 
right-wing parties) and the pro-ecology coalition (civil society organi-
sations, non-governmental organisations, and green and leftist parties). 
As a result, Switzerland’s climate policy has been torn between domestic 
setbacks and international ambitions. 
The first version of the Swiss CO2 Act was driven by international 
developments, since it aimed to implement the requirements laid out in 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, namely reducing total GHG emissions by 8 % 
(compared to 1990) by 2013 (FOEN, 2010). However, due to the in-
fluence of powerful actors from the business, transport, and energy 
sectors, the first act was rather weak, relying mainly on voluntary 
measures. CO2 inventories indicated early on that this would not suffice 
to reach the Kyoto Protocol commitments. Hence, a carbon tax on 
combustibles from industry and new buildings was introduced in 2008 
and augmented in stages in the following years. Conversely, lobbying 
activities by actors from the economy and fossil fuel industries pre-
vented the introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuels. This significantly 
undermined the country’s national climate policy insofar as the trans-
port sector was one of the greatest producers of carbon emissions in 
Switzerland. Dissatisfied with the national climate policy and spurred on 
by the international enthusiasm that was not only the result of the 
successful Bali Climate Change Conference in late autumn 2007, but also 
was fired up by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and Al Gore’s film “An Incon-
venient Truth”, the Swiss Climate Alliance of green and leftist parties, 
civil society organisations and NGOs launched the federal popular 
initiative ‘“For a healthy climate” in 2008. The initiative demanded the 
adoption of a much stricter emissions reduction target of 30 % by 2020 
(compared to 1990) and the inclusion of climate policy in the Swiss 
constitution. 
Very soon thereafter, however, the world experienced a decline in 
political enthusiasm for climate policy triggered by the failure of the 
international community to deliver a new and legally binding agreement 
at the climate conference in Copenhagen. In addition, a mistake in the 
AR4 of the IPCC undermined the institution’s credibility and climate 
science in general. On top of this, the global financial crisis in 2008 
severely impacted the global economy and pushed climate change off of 
the political agenda as policymakers turned their attention to economic 
issues. Against this backdrop, as a counterproposal to the public initia-
tive of the Climate Alliance, the Swiss federal government presented a 
draft to revise the Swiss CO2 Act in 2009. The revision was supposed to 
create a new legal framework for the second commitment period 
(2013–2020) of the Kyoto Protocol, but already during the public 
consultation stage, in which stakeholders were invited to give their 
opinion on the draft, several lines of conflict between the two dominant 
coalitions were revealed: the size of the emission reduction targets, the 
degree to which carbon offsetting abroad is an appropriate tool to 
reduce emissions (flexibility mechanisms), and the introduction of a 
carbon tax on motor fuels. Taken together, these lines of conflict illus-
trate that there was general disagreement about the best policy 
instruments. 
The revised version of the Swiss CO2 Act, which entered into force 
four years later in 2013, was a compromise solution between the two 
opposing coalitions. While it included a moderate reduction target of 20 
% by 2020 (compared to 1990) with a focus on domestic measures and a 
complex mix of different policy instruments targeting a wide range of 
sectors, the pro-economy coalition successfully prevented the intro-
duction of a carbon tax on motor fuels, thereby curbing effective regu-
lation of the transport sector – the only sector in Switzerland in which 
carbon emissions continue to rise (FOEN, 2014). 
Despite its failure, the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 
paved the way for the Paris Agreement of 2015. In small, iterative steps, 
the international community negotiated a completely new climate 
protection approach that relied on bottom-up, voluntary GHG emissions 
reduction pledges by all countries, instead of top-down obligations for 
industrialised countries only (Brun, 2016). So far, this development 
reached its peak in 2017 with the drafting of the Paris Rulebook as a first 
attempt to implement the Paris Agreement. In Switzerland, the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement led to two important developments: First, 
Switzerland ratified its new climate treaty in late 2017, and second, in 
2016, a new governmental proposal that suggested new pathways for 
the next revision of the Swiss CO2 Act to translate Switzerland’s inter-
national commitments to national legislation went to public consulta-
tion. However, similar to the earlier revisions, the two main coalitions 
disagreed on specific policy targets (the size of the reduction targets) and 
instruments (in particular the flexibility mechanisms). 
Methods of data collection and analysis 
To test our expectations, we conducted an in-depth discourse 
network analysis (DNA) of the policy discourse during three crucial 
periods. 
DNA periods 
Presented in Table 1, we have undertaken a DNA of three decisive 
periods to test our expectations with regard to the stability of key policy 
issues, actors and coalitions. 
We selected the periods so that they cover both important interna-
tional events, such as influential climate summits, and key developments 
in Swiss climate policy as described above. Furthermore, the selection of 2 “Largely” here means that we expect to observe the same coalitions, but 
these coalitions may be composed at least partly of different actors and/or 
preferences. 
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periods was also underpinned by the fluctuation of media attention 
between 1997 and 20173 as visualised in Fig. 1. We have selected three 
periods in which media attention peaked. 
Although the roots of Swiss climate legislation date back to the 
1980s, Switzerland’s media was rather oblivious to climate change for a 
long time. Even important international developments like the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 did not spark media interest. Media 
attention rose for the first time with the introduction of the Swiss CO2 
Act in 2000. In 2005, media attention reached a new high with the 
enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol. National public attention peaked in 
2007 with the successful Bali Climate Change Conference. In the same 
year, the Swiss federal government introduced a carbon tax on com-
bustibles and the “Climate Cent” – a voluntary tax on gas and diesel 
(Stiftung Klimarappen, 2013), and the Climate Alliance launched their 
initiatives “For a healthy climate”. In 2009, the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference and the new governmental draft for the revision of 
the Swiss CO2 Act attracted significant public attention, but it did not 
reach the same level as in 2007. This may have been related to the global 
financial crisis and the failure of international negotiations to deliver a 
substantial climate protection agreement. After 2009, media attention 
continued to drop before gaining new momentum in 2014 when the 
international community negotiated the Paris Agreement and its 
implementation step by step (Brun, 2016; Dimitrov, 2016; Obergassel 
et al., 2016) and Switzerland debated its ratification and translation into 
national law from 2016–2017. 
DNA: data collection and analysis 
As mentioned above, DNA is a well-established and widely applied 
method to identify important actors, salient issues, and prevailing co-
alitions, or to determine the level of polarisation around a specific issue 
(Leifeld, 2020, 2016). To conduct a DNA, the researcher identifies policy 
actors and their support for or rejection of a specific policy issue. This 
information can then be presented as an affiliation network between 
actors and issues.4 In these discourse networks, actors are the nodes of 
the network and co-rejection or co-support forms the tie. Many re-
searchers draw on newspaper articles to construct these kinds of net-
works (e.g., Broadbent et al., 2016), but in principle, this method can be 
applied to any kind of text material (e.g., parliamentary debates, con-
sultations, hearings, Tweets) that presents policy actors and their sup-
port for or rejection of a policy issue (see for example Bossner and Nagel, 
2020 for a DNA on Twitter data, Kammerer, 2018 for a DNA on a public 
consultation, or Schmidt et al., 2019 for a DNA on parliamentary 
debates). 
For this analysis, we draw on media discourse based on newspapers, 
since they cover a multitude of actors and policy issues and reflect the 
public attention towards climate change and climate policy. We 
searched three national newspapers for articles published on climate 
change that reproduce important societal splits that were potentially 
relevant for the Swiss climate policy discourse: the left-liberal “Tages- 
Anzeiger” (TA), the conservative “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (NZZ), and the 
francophone “Le Temps” (TEM). In all three newspapers, we searched 
for the following German and French keywords5 : “klima*”, “clima*”, 
(“climate”), “Globale Erwärmung” (“global warming”), and “CO2”.6 As 
shown in Table 2, our newspaper search resulted in 4,108 articles for the 
first period (2007–08), 3,476 for the second period (2009–10), and 
2,495 (2016–17) for the third period. 
To create the three discourse networks, we only need articles in 
which clearly identifiable collective actors, such as government entities, 
political parties, business actors, civil society groups, or scientific rep-
resentatives (Coleman, 1974), state their support for or rejection of 
policy issues related to climate change and climate policy. This requires 
the researcher to read all of the articles and select the relevant articles to 
be coded. This process is very labour intensive; thus, it is important to 
narrow down the number of articles to a manageable amount. For this 
purpose, many DNA applications draw sub-samples, e.g., take every 
“fourth” (Vesa et al., 2020, p. 4) or “fifth” (Stoddart et al., 2017, p. 390) 
article from the full set of articles, read them, and code the relevant ones 
manually. This procedure is repeated until a number of statements is 
achieved that represents the policy discourse within a given period. We 
took a different approach, which we perceive to be more effective and 
less prone to missing out on important aspects of policy discourse. First, 
we excluded all articles that dealt with climate change in a marginal 
way. We assumed that articles in which the keywords of our search 
string only appear a few times are irrelevant for the discourse network, 
and we therefore excluded those. To do this, we counted the number of 
times our keywords appeared in each article of the complete corpus of 
articles and excluded all articles in which the sum of keywords was less 
than or equal to two. As shown in Table 2, this approach significantly 
reduced the number of articles. Second, we followed the example of 
other DNA applications and excluded all articles below a certain word 
count (e.g., Nagel and Satoh, 2019). In our case, we removed all articles 
shorter than 500 words from the body text, since we assume that such 
articles are on average less relevant for the purpose of our analysis (e.g., 
Table 1 
Overview of the periods under review.  
Period November 2007 to December 2008 November 2009 to December 2010 November 2016 to December 2017 
International 
developments  
• Bali Climate Change Conference 
2007: Bali Road Map towards a new 
agreement  
• IPPC and Al Gore win the Nobel 
Peace Prize  
• IPCC AR4 published  
• The Copenhagen Climate Change 
Conference in 2009 fails to deliver a new 
international treaty  
• Marrakech Climate Change Conference in 2016: Debate on 
implementing Paris Agreement starts  




• 2008: Introduction of carbon tax on 
combustibles  
• 2008: Introduction of the “Climate 
Cent” tax  
• 2008: Public initiative “For a 
healthy climate” 
Spring and summer 2009:  
• Governmental proposal to revise the Swiss 
CO2 Act  
• Public consultation on the new proposal  
• June to December 2016: Public consultation on the new 
governmental proposal for the next revision of the Swiss CO2 Act 
to implement new international obligations  
• October 2017: Switzerland ratifies the Paris Agreement in 2017  
3 See Appendix 1 for the number of articles dealing with climate change every 
year and their share relative to the number of all articles that were published on 
any topic in the three outlets. Based on these numbers, we were able to 
determine the development of media attention on the topic of climate change 
over time and to embed this development within the context of important 
external events.  
4 Please note that there are many ways to create discourse networks. For an 
overview, see (Leifeld, 2020, 2016). 
5 We systematically excluded false positives for the German search string, 
such as “Klimaanlage” or “Klimatechnik” (“air-conditioning”) to reduce the 
noise in our data set. The exact search string we used in German is as follows: 
(Klima* or Globale Erwärmung or CO2*) not (Klimaanlage* or klimatisier* or 
Klimatechnik*).  
6 As a data source, we used Factiva, which is a media pool of around 35,000 
news sources (newspapers, magazines and wire services) from 200 countries. 
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readers’ comments, announcements of events). 
To check whether this approach excluded too many important arti-
cles, we searched in different subsets, i.e., word counts smaller than 100, 
smaller than 250, smaller than 500, and the full sample, for articles that 
covered topics that are important for the Swiss policy discourse, such as 
the “CO2-Gesetz” (“loi sur le CO2” in English: “Swiss CO2 Act”) and the 
“CO2-Abgabe” (“taxe sure le CO2”, in English: “carbon tax”). As shown 
in Table 2, by cutting down the articles, we certainly lose a number of 
articles dealing with those two topics, but we keep the most relevant 
ones (with a key word count greater than 2). Thus, our approach seems 
to be a reasonable trade-off between reducing coding work and keeping 
the most relevant articles in the corpus of articles. 
Finally, we import all the remaining articles into the Discourse 
Network Analyser (DNA) (Leifeld et al., 2018), which is the standard 
tool for manually coding discourse network data. Reading each article, 
we identified the articles that were relevant for constructing the 
discourse networks containing sentences or paragraphs that feature 
policy actors’ preferences on climate policy. In these articles, we coded 
the names of the policy actors, identified different statements made by 
policy actors, and attributed them to policy issues. These policy issues 
are either climate policy beliefs (e.g., “climate change is real and 
anthropogenic”), targets (e.g., “drastic reduction in energy consump-
tion”), or instruments (e.g., “market-based instruments instead of 
regulation”). For a full list of policy actors and issues for all three pe-
riods, please see Appendices 2 and 37 . 
We started with a predefined list of actors and policy issues and 
extended and adjusted this list separately for each period. In several 
rounds of data cleaning and re-coding, we merged policy actors and 
issues to be sure that the data sets did not contain any duplicate actors or 
issues within a period, or contain policy issues that are very similar to 
each other across the different periods. Since there were two of us coding 
the data, we coded one period twice (2007–08), discussed any in-
consistencies, and made refinements to the coding framework accord-
ingly (see Buckton et al., 2019 for a commonly applied coding procedure 
in DNA). See Table 2 for the number of articles considered and the actors 
and statements coded. Once we assigned actors to policy issues, we were 
able to export and analyse our policy discourse networks. For this pur-
pose, we used a combination of the “rDNA” R package and a Java-based 
DNA software tool (see Leifeld, 2018). Lastly, we loaded the DNA data 
set into our RStudio environment using the “rDNA” package. 
To test our expectations, we needed to understand if the majority of 
the actors, issues and coalitions remained the same across the three 
networks. As a first test, we counted the number of new actors (Expec-
tation 1) and issues (Expectation 2) as compared to the earlier period, 
and calculated the ratio of new to old actors and issues for each period. We 
also counted how many issues disappeared from the discourse and 
calculated the total ratio of change, i.e., the ratio of new and disappeared 
issues to old issues. If the ratio was lower than 1, we could conclude that 
the majority of actors and issues remained the same. However, relying 
on this simple, quantitative test alone would disregard the structure and 
meaning of our discourse networks. Thus, we also did two additional 
analyses. 
First, we quantitatively analysed the most salient actors or issues 
entering the discourse in Periods 2 and 3 at the centre of the policy 
discourse, assuming that actor or issues might “pop up” at the periphery 
of the discourse, while its centre might remain constant. To determine 
Fig. 1. Development of media attention over time (1997–2017).  
Table 2 
Number of articles, statements, actors and policy issues.   
Nov 07–Dec 08 Nov 09–Dec 10 Nov 16–Dec 17 
ALL ARTICLES 4,108 (186) 3,476 (146) 2,495 (107) 
SUBSTANTIVE ARTICLES 975 806 522 
WORD COUNT > 100 975 (131) 735 (111) 522 (58) 
WORD COUNT > 250 818 (77) 673 (99) 494 (55) 
WORD COUNT > 500 558 (66) 441 (40) 404 (43) 
USED FOR DNA 156 78 74 
ACTORS IDENTIFIED 55 45 50 
STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED 468 356 354 
POLICY ISSUES 
IDENTIFIED 
61 53 48  
7 We created our discourse networks using the Discourse Network Analyser 
(DNA). 
M. Kammerer and K. Ingold                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Social Networks xxx (xxxx) xxx
6
the most salient actors or issues, we used the normalised degree cen-
trality of the actor-actor and issue-issue network for all three periods. In 
these one-mode networks, a tie is present if a policy issue is commonly 
supported or rejected by policy actors. Since we are primarily interested 
the level of agreement (and not conflict) between two actors, we use 
“congruence” as qualifier argument. Congruence means that statements 
are only counted if two policy actors both agree, or both disagree, on a 
specific policy issue, i.e., a congruence network is a weighted network 
where the edge weight represents the number of times two policy actors 
co-support or co-reject an issue. Furthermore, we normalised our net-
works using the Jaccard similarity index to increase the comparability of 
the three discourse networks (Leifeld et al., 2018). The resulting 
network matrices are weighted, where values can float between 0 (no 
co-agreement or co-disagreement) and 1 (co-agreement or 
co-disagreement on all issues)8 . Issue degree reflects how often an issue 
is co-supported or co-rejected by two actors and is therefore a proxy for 
its salience. Actor degree reflects how often an actor co-agrees or 
co-disagrees with other actors. Normalisation sets this number in rela-
tion with the overall number of ties and makes it comparable across 
networks. Higher degree centrality values are associated with greater 
prevalence in the discourse. To ensure comparability across the three 
periods, we assessed the change among the top 20 actors/issues, i.e., 
those actors/issues with the highest degree centrality values, for each 
period. Again, we calculated the total ratio of change, i.e., issues that 
become salient or disappear (change) versus the issues that remain in the 
policy discourse (stability). If the ratio was smaller than 1, we could 
conclude that the majority of the most salient actors/issues remained the 
same. 
Second, we qualitatively analysed the most salient policy actors or 
issues in the discourse and compared them to the previous period, i.e., 
we compared Period 2 with Period 1, and Period 3 with Period 2. To do 
this, we identified the most salient actors/issues for both periods and 
determined whether (A) the actor/issue was present in all periods (Type 
A, stable actor/issue), (B) the actor/issue remained in the discourse from 
one period to the next (Type B, partially stable actor/issue), (C) the 
actor/issue increased in importance (Type C, actor/issue with increased 
salience), i.e., the actor/issue was already present in the earlier period, 
but not among the top 20 most salient actors/issues, (D) the actor/issue 
is not present among the top 20 within the current period(s), but was 
salient in the previous period (Type D, disappeared actor/issue), or (E) 
the actor/issue newly emerged in the discourse and was among the top 
20 most salient actors/issues (Type E, newly emerged actor/issue), i.e., 
it was not present in the earlier period. For Type E issues, we also 
assessed whether they were connected to previous topics or were 
completely new. To do this, we checked if the new issues were being 
discussed not only in the media, but also in the political discourse (e.g., 
parliament) and if they were present on the political agenda during the 
respective period. Many Type D and E issues could be an indicator for 
major change in the policy discourse. 
Finally, to test Expectation 3, we determined the prevalent discourse 
coalitions for all three periods. To do this, we conducted a cluster 
analysis of the three discourse networks using a clustering routine 
implemented in the rDNA package (Leifeld et al., 2018). To choose an 
appropriate clustering algorithm, we first calculated twelve different 
clustering algorithms for all three networks without a prior determina-
tion of the desired number of clusters. We selected the Walktrap algo-
rithm since it shows a reasonably high modularity9 value across all three 
networks. In contrast to the methods outlined above, we now used the 
“subtract” qualifier argument (see Leifeld et al., 2018, p. 7), since this 
was required by the clustering algorithm we selected. Here, conflict and 
congruence are combined in a weighted and signed network, with a 
positive number reflecting more congruence than conflict. To generate 
the clusters, we needed to disregard negative values and set them zero. 
Further, we excluded duplicate statements within the same document10 . 
We then qualitatively compared the results of the three cluster an-
alyses with respect to the composition of the clusters in each discourse 
network. For this purpose, we identified the actor types for all actors in 
all clusters. We coded the actors into the following types: government, 
political party, business, civil society, science and international orga-
nisation (IO); see Appendix 2. Furthermore, we drew on earlier research 
on advocacy coalitions in Switzerland’s climate policy (e.g., Ingold, 
2011) to understand which actors usually form coalitions based on their 
shared beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Both helped us to 
classify and name the observed clusters. Table 3 shows which actor type 
we expected to find in which discourse coalition. Accordingly, we as-
sume that a “pro-ecology” discourse coalition that is composed of civil 
society organisations, governmental actors (e.g., environmental 
department), and left-wing parties would tend to support policy issues 
that are in favour of more ambitious climate change mitigation actions. 
Conversely, we assume that business groups and right-wing parties will 
be more in line with “pro-economy” policy issues. Lastly, we expect to 
find an “intermediate group” that consists of overwhelmingly govern-
mental actors and scientists supporting both pro-economy and 
pro-ecology positions. At this point, it is important to note that discourse 
coalitions are not the same as the advocacy coalitions that are deter-
mined based on collaboration or coordination in policy networks (see 
Schaub and Metz, 2020 for a comparison between the two). Hence, we 
do not expect to find discourse coalitions that perfectly match with the 
theoretically expected advocacy coalitions in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, we plotted heat maps for all three periods to identify 
which policy issues united the discourse coalitions (see Appendix 5, 
Figures D–F). To illustrate the discourse coalitions, we plotted the 
discourse coalitions in an actor-actor network using the R package 
ggplot211 and identified discourse coalitions using a colour code. To plot 
the networks, we selected the Fruchtermann-Reingold layout algorithm. 
For the actor-actor network, we used the “congruence” qualifier aggre-
gation (Leifeld et al., 2018, p. 6) and normalised the network using the 
Jaccard similarity index. Furthermore, we reduced the size of the 
network by excluding all actors with a degree centrality below 1. In 
Appendix 6, Figures A–C, we also show the original dendrograms of the 
three cluster analyses. Expectation 3 will be confirmed if the number 
and composition of discourse coalitions stay the same. 
Results 
Stability and change in the Swiss climate policy discourse: actors and issues 
To test Expectation 1 (the majority of actors remain the same over 
time), we analysed the change in the actor configuration. As shown in 
Table 4, the ratio of new to old actors for all three periods is less than 1. 
Specifically, we observed that there are more “old” than “new” actors 
Table 3 
Expected coalitions in the climate policy discourse.  
Pro-ecology Pro-economy Intermediate group 
Civil society organisations Business groups Governmental actors 
Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Science 
Governmental actors 
Adapted from Ingold (2011) and Ingold and Varone (2012). 
8 To construct the one-mode networks, no thresholding was done, but we 
excluded self-loops, i.e., actors with a degree centrality equal to 1.  
9 In general, modularity is the likelihood that a component will break down 
into into smaller components. 
10 To construct the one-mode networks, no thresholding was done, but we 
excluded self-loops, i.e., actors with a degree centrality equal to 1.  
11 See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/ggplot2/index.html. 
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in the policy discourse, which indicates stability. However, at the same 
time, a considerable number of actors leave the discourse. Hence, if we 
include the actors that disappear from the discourse from one period to 
the next in our calculation, the total ratio of change is greater than 1, 
which means that we observe at least some change in the configuration 
of actors in the policy discourse. Our analysis, therefore, shows mixed 
evidence and points to Expectation 1 not being met. 
Since we find greater change among actors in the policy discourse 
than theoretically expected, it is now of interest to see who exactly stays 
and who leaves the discourse. Therefore, we went beyond the quanti-
tative assessment of the stability and change across all actors and 
investigated the top 20 actors in the very same way that we later 
investigated the most salient policy issues. We determined the top 20 
actors based on their normalised degree centrality and analysed if (A) 
the actor was present in all periods, (B) the actor remained in the 
discourse from one period to the next, (C) the actor increased in 
importance, i.e., was already present in the earlier period, but not 
among the top 20, (D) the actor disappeared from the top 20 in the 
previous period(s), or (E) the actor newly emerged in the discourse, i.e., 
was not already present in the earlier period. 
Table 5 presents this additional analysis for the top 20 actors across 
the three periods. The analysis shows that despite the change we 
observed when testing Expectation 1, the climate policy discourse in 
Switzerland is rather stable with respect to its key protagonists and 
consists of several “usual suspects”, such as the major political parties 
(Swiss People’s Party, FDP. The Liberals, Christian People’s Party, Green 
Party Switzerland, and Social-Democratic Party), environmental NGOs 
(in particular WWF Switzerland), governmental actors (in particular the 
Federal Council), and scientific representatives (in particular ETH Zur-
ich). Overall, the analysis shows that more key actors remain constant 
across all three periods (Type A), remain at least in the next period (Type 
B), or exist in the periphery of earlier periods (Type C). In contrast, 
change among the key actors is less frequent. In the period from 
2009–2010, only six completely new actors appeared, and in the period 
from 2016–2017 it was only two (Type E). Also, the total ratio of change 
in both periods is below 1, meaning that the majority of the top 20 actors 
remained the same. Thus, we observed change among actors both if we 
look at all actors and if we take a closer look at the centre of the policy 
discourse. However, at the centre of the discourse, we also observed that 
the majority of actors were constantly present. 
To test Expectation 2 (the majority of issues remain the same over 
time), we assessed the change in the configuration of all issues from one 
period to the next. As shown in Table 6, the ratio of new to old issues 
between the first and second periods and between the second and third 
periods below 1. Similar to what we saw for the actors, if we include the 
issues that have disappeared from the discourse, the observed total ratio 
of change is always very clearly above 1, which points to more change 
than stability in the policy discourse network over time with regards to 
policy issues. This again provides mixed evidence and indicates that 
Expectation 2 was not met. 
Table 7 presents the analysis of stability and change among the 20 
most salient policy issues over time. As shown above, we distinguished 
Table 4 
Ratio of old to new actors.   
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 1 AND 2 
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 2 AND 3 
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 1 AND 3 
SAME ACTORS 29 32 28 
NEWLY 
EMERGED 
16 18 22 
DISAPPEARED 
ACTORS 
26 13 27 
RATIO NEW/OLD 0.55 0.56 0.79 
RATIO TOTAL 
CHANGE 
1.45 0.97 1.75  
Table 5 
Stability and change among the top 20 actors.  
Period 2007–08 2009–10 2016–17 
TOTAL 51 45 45 
Unique 18 2 2 
Top 20 22 21 20 




Green Party Switzerland 
FDP. The Liberals 
NGOs 
Christian People’s Party 
WWF Switzerland   
2009–10 2016–17 
TYPE B (partially 
stable) 
Economiesuisse Federal parliament 





Type C (increased 
importance) 











Swiss Academies of Arts and 
Sciences 
Swiss People’s Party 
No. of stable actors 
(Type A þ BþC) 15 18 
Type D (disappeared) 
City/Municipal 
Council Cantonal government 


















Oeschger Center for Climate 
Change Research Relief 
organisations 
Travail Suisse Swiss Trade Association 
Type E (newly 
emerged) 




Oeschger Center for 
Climate Change Swiss 
Trade Association 
Swisscleantech 
No. of changed actors 
(Type D þ E) 12 11 
Total ratio of change 0.80 0.61  
Table 6 
Ratio of old to new issues.   
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 1 AND 2 
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 2 AND 3 
CHANGE 
BETWEEN 
PERIOD 1 AND 3 
ALL ISSUES 
SAME ISSUES 28 26 24 
NEWLY 
EMERGED 
25 22 24 
DISAPPEARED 
ISSUES 
33 27 37 
RATIO NEW/OLD 0.89 0.85 1.00 
RATIO TOTAL 
CHANGE 
2.07 1.88 2.54  
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five possible scenarios of stability or change in the centre of the policy 
discourse: Type A (stable issue), Type B (partially stable issue), Type C 
(issue with increased importance over time), Type D (disappeared 
issue), Type E (newly emerged issue). Our analysis shows that policy 
issues seem to iteratively adjust over time in line with both international 
and domestic political developments, and that this was also the case in 
the centre of the policy discourse. As we can see in the last row of 
Table 7, the total ratio of change (which includes newly emerged and 
disappeared policy issues) is greater than 1 for both periods, which 
implies that the majority of policy issues among the 20 most salient ones 
do change. Thus, depending on the current political and policy context, a 
rather stable set of key policy actors (as we have seen above) apparently 
agree or disagree about different policy instruments and targets. 
Furthermore, only two of the most salient policy issues are reproduced 
over time: the discussion of whether or not 
Switzerland’s climate policy should allow for “flexible carbon off-
setting abroad” and whether “Switzerland should take (a) leading role” 
in international climate change mitigation action. Similarly, we observe 
in total only ten Type B and nine Type C policy issues, i.e., very few 
policy issues are reproduced over time. In contrast, there are many 
policy issues that disappear from the discourse (Type D, 29) or newly 
emerge (Type E, 18). 
If we take a closer look at the qualitative meaning of the policy 
issues, we find that the observed change is less radical than the pure 
quantitative analysis suggests. The second period (2009–2010) includes 
ten new policy issues, but they are all linked to topics that have been on 
the political agenda for a long time. Two of them are linked to the Swiss 
CO2 Act, which was already adopted in 2000. If we focus on the next 
“revision of the Swiss CO2 Act”, policy actors discuss an increased 
emission reduction target (20 % instead of 10 %) and the suitability of 
well-known “voluntary instruments”. Moreover, the debate about 
whether “climate action is politically feasible” and “climate awareness is 
low” is probably linked to the mistake that was discovered in the IPCC’s 
AR4 and the decreased media attention to the topic of climate change 
after the failure of the Copenhagen conference. Similarly, the remaining 
policy issues are linked to international climate politics, such as the 
demand for “binding national emissions reduction targets” or a “finan-
cial transfer to developing countries”, as well as the discussion of the 
adequacy of Switzerland’s climate policy (“federal climate policy is 
sufficient”) and its energy mix (“promotion of alternative energies”). 
These do not bring any real innovation to the discourse, but rather 
reflect the topics of an ongoing policy process. Only the discussion of the 
introduction of an “energy tax” in Switzerland marks a new policy issue 
and is likely a first indication of new policy developments concerning 
the adoption a new energy policy strategy and later a new energy law 
(for a study on Swiss energy policy, see Kammermann and Ingold, 2019). 
Table 7 
Stability and change among the top 20 issues.  
Period 2007–08 2009–10 2016–17 
TOTAL 61 53 50 
Unique 18 13 13 
Top 20 20 22 20 
Type A (stable) 
Flexible carbon offsetting abroad 
Switzerland should take leading role   
2009/10 2016/17 
TYPE B (partially stable) 
Carbon tax on fuels CC as business opportunity 
Coordination with EU CC regime Energy tax 
International carbon tax Financial transfer to developing countries 
Promotion of energy efficiency Revision of the Swiss CO2 Act 
Urge for immediate action (no wait-and-see strategy) Stricter regulation of vehicles 
Type C (increased importance) 
CC as business opportunity Ambitious reduction targets (>20 %) 
CC is (also) a development issue High-quality certificates 
Compensation obligation for new gas-fired power plants Link to EU ETS 
Drastic reduction in energy consumption needed 
Promotion of nuclear power Stricter regulation of vehicles 
No. stable issues (Type A þ BþC) 12 12 
Type D (disappeared) 
2000-Watt-Society 20 % reduction (national target) 
CC is one of biggest challenges of humanity Binding national emissions reduction targets needed 
CO2 label for food CC action politically feasible 
“Climate Cent” valuable contribution to reducing emissions CC is (also) a development issue 
Earmarking of carbon tax Carbon tax on fuels 
Great(est) potential for GHG reductions/energy savings is in the buildings sector Climate awareness is low 
Promotion of biofuels as alternative energy Compensation obligation for new gas-fired power plants 
Promotion of fossil energy Coordination with EU CC regime 
Promotion of renewable energies Drastic reduction in energy consumption needed 
Promotion of wood-fired power plants Federal climate protection measures sufficient 
Strong international agreement/institutions International carbon tax 
Switzerland’s ambition/measures sufficient 
Promotion of alternative energies 
Promotion of energy efficiency 
Urge for immediate action (no wait-and-see strategy) 
Voluntary instruments 
Type E (newly emerged) 
20% reduction (national target) Energy law or strategy 
Binding national emissions reduction targets needed Green investments 
CC action politically feasible Prevention of climate risks 
Climate awareness is low National measures in aviation sector needed 
Energy tax Swiss ETS not efficient 
Federal climate protection measures sufficient Trump administration is a threat for CC 
Financial transfer to developing countries Swiss ratification of PA 
Revision of the Swiss CO2 Act 
Increased carbon tax on combustibles Promotion of alternative energies 
Voluntary instruments 
No. changed issues (Type D þ E) 22 23 
Total ratio of change 1.83 1.91  
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In 2016 to 17, eight new issues appeared in the policy discourse, five 
issues increased in importance from Period 2–3, and seven issues were 
reproduced from the earlier periods, either as Type A or B issues. Two 
issues can be considered “brand new” topics, since they relate to current 
developments at international scale, i.e., the pending “ratification of 
Paris Agreement” and the climate policy of the administration of former 
US President Donald Trump, which is often perceived as “a threat to 
climate change mitigation”. Two policy issues indicate a rather novel 
topic in Switzerland’s domestic climate policy, namely the discourse 
around the “prevention of climate risks” and the closely related topic of 
“green innovations” triggered by insurance companies and pension 
funds. In addition, the discussion of whether “national measures in (the) 
aviation sector (are) needed”, appears for the first time in Period 3. In 
contrast, the remaining topics relate to existing policy instruments, the 
emission trading system (“ETS not sufficient”), and the carbon tax on 
combustibles (“increased carbon tax on combustibles”) and cannot be 
considered new topics in the discourse. 
To conclude, our analysis provides some evidence that policy issues 
change over time according to international and national developments, 
but not radically. 
Stasis and change of the Swiss climate policy discourse: discourse 
coalitions 
To test Expectation 3 (actor coalitions remain the same over time), 
we used a cluster analysis to identify discourse coalitions, i.e., cohesive 
subgroups that support or reject similar policy issues in the respective 
discourse. 
For the 2007–2008 network (see Fig. 2), we identified eleven clusters 
(see Appendix 5, Figure A, for the dendrogram). Eight of these clusters 
are single actors and cannot be assigned to a specific discourse coalition 
(grey nodes), but we were able to match the remaining three clusters to 
mostly meaningful discourse coalitions, namely the pro-ecology (dark 
green nodes), the intermediate group (light green nodes), and the pro- 
economy coalition (red nodes). The pro-ecology coalition is the largest 
of the three subgroups. As expected, it comprises left-wing parties, civil 
society organisations, environmental NGOs, a governmental body (the 
Federal Office of Energy), and local government actors. In addition, a 
number of science actors can be counted among the members of this 
coalition. The most important uniting policy issues are that coalition 
members mostly reject the “promotion of fossil fuels”, “flexible carbon 
offsetting abroad”, and the “promotion of nuclear power”, but support a 
“carbon tax on motor fuels”. The only outlier in this coalition is the 
Homeowners Association (HEV), which is usually not a natural member 
of the pro-ecology coalition. However, like other members of this coa-
lition, the HEV supported the earmarking of the carbon tax. In contrast, 
the pro-economy coalition only comprises 17 actors and is made up of 
actors from private business, the economy, transport, industry, energy, 
conservative and liberal parties, as well as the State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs and the Federal Council. The uniting elements are the 
rejection of the “carbon tax on motor fuels”, the support of “flexible 
carbon offsetting abroad” and the “promotion of nuclear power”. As 
expected, we identified a small third group of actors, the intermediate 
group, comprised of relief organisations, the Swiss Agency for Devel-
opment and Cooperation, actors from the financial industry and insur-
ance companies, and several scientific institutions. It is difficult to define 
uniting policy issues for this group, since they support policy issues 
across the range, but many of them perceive climate change “as a 
business opportunity”. See Appendix 5, Figure D, for a heat map of the 
policy discourse in 2007–2008 that shows which policy issues are most 
commonly shared among the members of a discourse coalition. Overall, 
the climate policy discourse in 2007–2008 revealed coalitions in line 
with what we would have expected for the Swiss climate policy network 
at that time. The overall positive attitude towards climate protection is 
visible in the discourse and is reflected by the large number of pro- 
ecology actors prevalent in the discourse. 
As shown in Fig. 3, the 2009–2010 discourse network seems to be 
divided between two main coalitions. In fact, our cluster analysis also 
allowed us to draw the same conclusion (see Appendix 5, Figure B, for 
the respective dendrogram). The clustering algorithm identified seven 
clusters. Five small clusters are comprised of only one or two actors and 
cannot be matched with any specific coalition (grey nodes). Two large 
clusters, however, fit very well with what we would expect to see with 
respect to a split into a pro-economy coalition (red nodes) and a pro- 
ecology coalition (dark green nodes). As in the previous period, the 
pro-ecology coalition is larger (n = 23) than the pro-economy coalition 
(n = 16). Also, the two coalitions are comprised of the actor types that 
we would expect: green and left-wing parties, civil society organisations, 
Fig. 2. One-mode network with discourse coalitions, 2007–08 (degree of centrality > 1; algorithm layout: Fruchterman-Reingold).  
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and some governmental actors are in the pro-ecology coalition, whereas 
business actors and right-wing parties belong to the pro-economy coa-
lition. In terms of their preferred policy issues, the pro-ecology coalition 
is united by a widespread agreement on strong emissions reduction 
targets and ambitious climate action. Hence, many actors demand a 
“drastic reduction in energy consumption” and bold emissions reduction 
targets higher than the 20 % national reduction target. Similar to the 
previous period, another uniting policy issue is the support of the 
introduction of a carbon tax on motor fuels (“carbon tax on fuels”). The 
pro-economy coalition is united by three key policy issues: Firstly, many 
actors support the idea of coordinating Switzerland’s climate policy with 
EU ambitions (“coordination with EU target”) to avoid competitive 
disadvantages. Secondly, and in contrast to the pro-ecology coalition, 
many actors support the national reduction target of 20 % with only few 
hardliners (like the Swiss People’s Party) rejecting it for being too 
ambitious. Lastly, once again in this second period, the pro-economy 
coalition is united by supporting the concept of flexibility in order to 
achieve the reduction of carbon emissions (“flexible carbon offsetting 
abroad”). Overall, it must be highlighted that the discourse in 
2009–2010 much more clearly reveals a conflict line between the two 
opposing coalitions, and that there is no longer an intermediate coali-
tion. See Appendix 5, Figure E, for a heat map of the policy discourse in 
2009–2010 that shows which policy issues are most commonly are 
shared among the members of a discourse coalition. 
Lastly, the results of the cluster analysis of the discourse network in 
2016–2017 (see Figure C and F in Appendix 5) reveal a very different 
picture compared to the two previous periods. The cluster algorithm 
identified 15 clusters, with many very small clusters of one to four actors 
that cannot be clearly assigned to any one coalition. The only mean-
ingful discourse coalition we were able to determine is a comparably 
large pro-ecology coalition comprised of 19 actors from science, civil 
society, green and left-wing political parties, and governmental actors. 
Interestingly, the Federal Council is now part of the pro-ecology coali-
tion in contrast to the other two periods, where it was more in line with 
pro-economy or intermediate positions. As in previous periods, the most 
important policy issue uniting the pro-ecology coalition was support for 
an “ambitious reduction target”. Furthermore, this coalition was rather 
critical about the effectiveness of the Swiss emissions trading system and 
supported the adoption of a new energy law focussing on the transition 
to sustainable energy production. Interestingly, the pro-economy coa-
lition is non-existent in the discourse at this time, but seems to be 
splintered into to several smaller subgroups. Specifically, we can iden-
tify three different groups that formerly comprised the pro-economy 
coalitions: a small group of hardliners like economiesuisse, the Swiss 
People’s Party, or the oil industry; a group of six moderate pro-economy 
actors from industry and the government; and a group of economic ac-
tors that commonly support green investments and climate risk pre-
vention. Nevertheless, these groups are not linked by many shared co- 
supported or co-rejected policy issues, which does not allow for clear- 
cut assignment to a specific discourse coalition (see the heat map in 
Appendix 5, Figure F). Hence, as shown in Fig. 4, the only coalition 
identified in Period 3 was the pro-ecology (dark green nodes). 
In sum, we observed considerable change in the policy discourse 
with respect to the discourse coalitions. While the first period 
(2007–2008) revealed three coalitions (pro-ecology, pro-economy, and 
intermediate) as expected, the policy discourse in the second period 
(2009–2010) was more polarised, with two rather clear opposing co-
alitions. The third period (2016–2017) then shows a completely 
different picture, with only one obvious coalition: the pro-ecology coa-
lition. In terms of the uniting policy issues, however, we observed some 
stability: The pro-ecology actors tend to support ambitious targets 
(greater than 20 % reduction in emissions), Switzerland’s leading role in 
the international climate policies, and stricter policies (e.g., a carbon tax 
on fuels or measures in the aviation sector). In contrast, although they 
are less united than in earlier periods, pro-economy actors are still in 
favour a less ambitious climate policy with greater flexibility in terms of 
how to implement respective measures. Nevertheless, the results of our 
analysis do not allow us to confirm Expectation 3, since neither the 
number of coalitions, nor their uniting policy instruments, over-
whelmingly remained the same. 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this article, we analysed the Swiss climate policy discourse and 
showed how the actors, issues and coalitions therein evolved over time. 
We used discourse network analysis to test our expectations about sta-
bility and change in a mature policy discourse, building our theoretical 
argumentation on theories of the policy process. 
Fig. 3. One-mode network with discourse coalitions, 2009–10 (degree of centrality > 1, algorithm layout: Fruchterman-Reingold).  
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In general, our results provided mixed evidence in terms of our 
expectation that change is rare in a mature policy discourse and that 
stability is the rule. Rather, we observed more change than expected 
with regard to the policy actors, issues, and, in particular, the coalitions. 
So, while many salient issues and the majority of key policy actors 
indeed remained the same and have been present in the Swiss climate 
policy discourse over the past 15 years, almost exactly the contrary is 
true as well: often more than half of the issues and actors disappeared 
and new topics and issues emerged between the periods observed. As a 
result, we cannot fully support or reject Expectations 1 and 2. 
As we dig deeper, however, we get closer to the confirmation of our 
first and second expectations. The protagonists and most central actors 
within the discourse, such as the political parties represented in 
parliament, the top associations of the Swiss industry, and the largest 
green NGOs, largely stayed the same over time and remained active in 
the discourse (see also Ingold et al., 2021). Furthermore, when the issues 
changed, they did so rather iteratively, i.e., in a way that was linked to 
existing topics and in line with the political agenda. Moreover, we 
observed that policy discourses often take up new policy instruments or 
targets that are part of a new policy proposal or that are related to the 
current international developments. Further, we have observed that the 
international policy agenda is also reflected in the discourse within 
Switzerland. Thus, an interesting observation is that the domestic media 
reports on policies and policy issues not only on the domestic level, but 
also on the international level as well. 
When looking at discourse coalitions, the picture is an interesting 
one. Coalition structure is clearer cut in the first two periods, but be-
comes more fragmented over time. This finding is different than ex-
pected and related to several perspectives: First, the analysis of advocacy 
coalitions in the Swiss policy process almost always reflects stability and 
a clear differentiation between the two main pro-ecology and pro- 
economy coalitions (Ingold, 2008; Ingold and Fischer, 2014). Howev-
er, these findings are based on elite studies with a smaller set of policy 
actors that closely aligns with the top 20 key actors that we present in 
Table 5. As a result, the political discourse, and therefore also the 
discourse coalitions, might be more inclusive than advocacy coalitions. 
When comparing discourse and advocacy coalitions in the German 
Water Policy subsystem, Schaub and Metz (2020) come to the conclu-
sion that media emphasises one type of actor (e.g., expanders). We add 
to this result by suggesting that advocacy coalitions based on elite 
surveys might be more restrictive than media in terms of their definition 
of actors. Accordingly, the actor “identification” of both those 
“methods” or “outlets” differs to some extent, which obviously leads to a 
difference in the identified coalition structures as well (see also Vesa 
et al., 2020 for a discussion about “media visibility”). To see if this holds 
true in the context of Swiss climate policy, a comparison of advocacy 
coalitions based on elite surveys, and of discourse coalitions based on 
media data, would be necessary and should be part of a future research 
agenda. Second, policy process theories often discuss the evolution of a 
policy subsystem from nascent to mature (Stritch, 2015). They thereby 
relate this maturation to the fact that coalitions of convenience or 
epistemic communities turn into more organised and coherent groups of 
actors over time. Here, we almost observe the contrary: Over time, the 
pro-economy coalition gets fragmented and splits into diverse subgroups 
that prefer different policy measures and different beliefs related to 
Swiss climate policy. More comparative research is needed to find evi-
dence as to whether this difference between policy discourses and pro-
cesses can be systematically observed, or if this is a unique observation 
of the case studied here. Nevertheless, it is true that the policy discourse 
on climate policy, at least in Switzerland, has become highly complex 
due to the growing portfolio of policy measures that have been discussed 
and adopted in the past 15 years. Apparently, more nuanced policy 
portfolios seem to split established coalitions and increase fragmenta-
tion over time, at least in the media discourse. However, again, further 
research would be needed to understand if this this a phenomenon 
specific to Switzerland or if this observation can be applied more 
generally. For this purpose, we need more studies that do not solely 
observe policy discourses one period at a time, but rather compare de-
velopments across periods, as well as studies that include varying de-
grees of complexity and also potentially cover different countries and 
policy areas. 
This research is confronted with three key methodological limita-
tions. To begin with, assessing stability and change in discourse greatly 
depends upon the consistency of coding over time on the one hand, and 
on the coding scheme’s flexibility in terms of change on the other. 
Therefore, it is important to ensure that the same issues or actors can be 
identified over time. However, at the same time, new issues and actors 
are allowed to enter the discourse. In this context, it is not always clear 
which new issues and actors are worth including in the coding process 
and which are not. In this regard, we found it very helpful to triangulate 
Fig. 4. One-mode network with discourse coalitions, 2016–17 (degree of centrality > 1; algorithm layout: Fruchterman-Reingold).  
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our DNA data set with relevant official policy documents that appeared 
before or during the selected periods, such as policy drafts or new in-
ternational agreements, in order to consider new issue and actors. Sec-
ond, while media data have clear advantages, i.e., they are a reliable 
source to observe the development of a policy discourse over time, it 
must be stressed that the media acts as a filter. Media contributions are 
created by humans, who are themselves “subject to their cultural 
background, their opinions, and their emotions” (Kammerer, 2018, p. 
35). In addition, newspapers are also embedded in a socio-political 
context that can vary over time. Thus, a policy discourse based on 
media data is certainly dependent on the priorities of the journalists and 
the media companies involved, as well as the respective zeitgeist of a 
media outlet. In this research, we have therefore tried to select news-
papers that cover the most important societal cleavages; in particular, 
we covered the two largest language regions in Switzerland (German 
and French) and the divide between left and right values. Further data 
collection should ideally also cover the third-largest language group in 
Switzerland, Italian, and potentially also include tabloid media to cover 
more diverse opinions from across educational levels. Covering more 
newspapers, however, means assessing more articles, which brings us to 
the final key limitation of this research. Manual coding is very 
labour-intensive and therefore costly to replicate. For this reason, it is 
important to find suitable ways to limit the selection of articles, for 
example by only coding a random subset of articles. However, this 
approach could accidentally lead to biased results. We pursued a 
different approach by narrowing down our search results to the most 
substantive articles, i.e., the longer ones and the ones with more relevant 
keywords. Of course these thresholds are somewhat arbitrary assump-
tions that a DNA researcher needs to make in order to limit the work-
load. One option to solve this problem could be to at least semi-automate 
the data collection process. Some inspiration to this end can be found in 
the promising work of Haunss et al. (2020). 
Lastly, our results also have some practical relevance: As new actors 
seem to have a hard time entering the political discourse and ultimately 
the political system, if one’s aim is to radically change (Swiss) climate 
policy, as is the stated objective of the Fridays for Future movement, for 
example, the preferences of the well-established political elite are what 
need to be changed. Furthermore, over time, incremental changes can 
lead to substantial policy outcomes: Rather than being strongly 
impacted by international negotiations, the Swiss domestic climate 
policy discourse is an example of steady, evidence-based policy learning. 
This speaks for greater inclusion of younger generations as well as sci-
entists and experts in climate-related decision-making. 
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Vesa, J., Gronow, A., Ylä-Anttila, T., 2020. The quiet opposition: how the pro-economy 
lobby influences climate policy. Glob. Environ. Change 63, 102117. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2020.102117. 
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